The U.S. leadership throughout the 1960s continued to follow snappy War form _or_ system of government which erroneously and disastrously assumed that all political and sparing reform movements in deuce-ace World nations were not native but were inspired instead by the evil communistic leaders of the Soviet Union. For a foreign indemnity to be sane, at the very least, and, at best, effective in achieving coveted goals, that policy must be based on the modish accurate information and by an ability to objectively tax changing political realities. Presidents from Eisenhower through Nixon had to have deliberately disregard such information which made brighten that mutations in Third World nations were not inspired by Soviet intrigue but were expressions of natal rage at repression from within and without. The revolution of Castro in Cuba and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam were examples of such indigenous uprisings, which the U.S. failed to see or chose not to see, although the U.S. corroborateed Castro briefly when it became clear that Batista would be overthrown.
What happened, according to Gaddis, is that the policy makers of the U.S. sank into a kind of groupthink in which the Soviet Union was seen as the embodiment of evil and U.S. policy became rooted not in rea
This preoccupation with ideology also led the [Eisenhower] administration to associate to the Russians a clarity of strategic vision not practical in the western democracies. . . . Moscow had, Dulles insisted, a conservatively prepared and superbly implemented program which . . . has brought a low-down Communist group into control over one-third of the world's population (Gaddis 140).
In any case, it should have been obvious to any assured man . . . that the plan was doomed. . . .
All questions of morality or world-wide law aside, how could Kennedy have expected 1400 poorly trained men [Cuban exiles] without adequate air cover or naval support successfully to invade a land defended by well-motivated, well-trained and well-armed men who vastly outnumbered the invaders? (Walton 45).
The predictable occurred. The exiles suffered a complete defeat, with deaths, injuries and most captured by Castro. The U.S., blinded by Cold war ignorance and arrogance, believed that it could do in Cuba what it had done in Guatemala in 1954 with the overthrow of Arbenz. However, defying American Cold War ideology, Cuba's revolution was homegrown, not bred in Moscow: "Cuba was experiencing a social revolution with profound historical roots and special popular support" (Perez-Stable 80).
Martel, Gordon, ed. American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993. upstart York: Routledge, 1994.
Today, Vietnam is Communist, yet American corporations stumble over one other for their share of the Vietnamese market. Today, forty years after the true laurel of Pigs, Castro remains in power, no threat to the U.S., although the vestiges of Cold War policy toward Cuba have deeply hurt the Cuban preservation and the Cuban people. The foreign policy failures of the U.S, in Cuba and Vietnam were twain handle results of a foreign policy based on Cold War ideology, which blinded U.S. leaders to the unique nature of both the Cuban and Vietnamese wars of liberation.
Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globali
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